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The Habsburg officer corps of the late nineteenth century 
played a significant role in sustaining the feudal anachronism 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Despite its constant appeals 
to tradition, it was in fact a product of the struggles to reform 
the army. The tensions that resulted are evident in the military 
press of the reform period and left their mark on the officers‟ 
ideology. 
 
The Habsburg officer corps from 1867 to 1914 was distin-
guished from its contemporary counterparts among the 
European powers by a unique ideology. In outlining this 
ideology and the patterns of knowledge that it drew upon, 
this brief account will draw upon both hard historical data 
and more ephemeral material from the contemporary press.  
The Habsburg officers‟ ideology represented on the one 
hand an authentic military tradition, stretching back 
through the era of Radetzky to the Napoleonic wars and 
the defence of Vienna against the Ottoman Empire. On the 
other hand, significant aspects of the ideology were of 
comparatively recent vintage and can be traced to the up-
heavals of the mid-nineteenth century. Those momentous 
events produced a need for a new and relatively untried 
institution – the professional officer corps.
1
 Where the 
officer corps of the pre-reform era had been dominated by 
the aristocracy, after 1868 its members were increasingly 
middle-class and drawn from a progressively isolated so-
cial caste who were the sons of soldiers and other Habs-
burg civil servants. Günter Kronenbitter sums this up in a 
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telling phrase in his study of Austro-Hungarian military 
leadership before the First World War: „Tornisterkinder 
unter sich‟.
2
 Henry Wickham Steed‟s contemporary obser-
vation of Habsburg officers at the start of the twentieth 
century as a „kind of Samurai caste‟ contains the remark 
that „many families of modest fortune have been “military” 
for generations, sending all or most of their sons into the 
Army and Navy‟.
3
 For the bulk of officers who were from 
this „stock of military families‟, in Wickham Steed‟s words 
„one of the great assets of the dynasty‟, issues of social 
acceptability and demarcation between officers and other 
groups were existential questions. Despite not being par-
ticularly well paid, they were expected to keep up the ap-
pearance of latter-day knights, referring to themselves as 
„der erste und ritterlichste Stand‟, the „first and most chiv-
alrous estate‟.
4
 The flood of pamphlets and handbooks on 
the duel (when to duel, who was satisfaktionsfähig, or 
socially acceptable as an adversary) betokens not just the 
existence and importance of individual combat as a means 
to resolve questions of honour, but perhaps also a degree 
of social panic and an increasingly desperate need to hold 
on to those privileges that identified officers as a distinc-
tive group. 
Two major military defeats in quick succession – in 
1859 and 1866 – at Solferino and Königgrätz – triggered a 
profound shift in military policy.
5
 The existing, largely 
aristocratic military elites took the brunt of the blame. 
However diplomatically it is represented in some accounts, 
                                                        
2 Günther Kronenbitter,“Krieg im Frieden”, p. 17. 
3 Henry Wickham Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 62-63. See 
also Gunther Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p.151. 
4 Gunther Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p. 82. 
5 See Gunther Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, pp. 74-79.  
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we should observe that after Königgrätz, two former heads 
of the general staff, Ludwig von Benedek – who some 
present as bearing most responsibility for losing a war 
from a position of advantage – and Alfred von Henikstein 
left the army in disgrace. The Kriegsschule instructor who 
had educated large numbers of general staff officers impli-
cated in the defeats, the conservative Gideon von Kris-
manich, suffered a similar fate.
6
 Senior officers by and 
large blamed the general staff for the catastrophe. 
Historians of the defeat in the Austro-Prussian cam-
paign have typically concentrated on the technological 
superiority of the Prussian forces. Alongside the use of 
railways to deploy troops and the telegraph to communi-
cate, the Dreyse Nadelgewehr or preußische Zündnadel-
gewehr - the needle rifle, a breech-loading weapon so 
called because of its needle-shaped firing mechanism - 
gave the Prussian infantry superior fire power and made 
the shock tactics of advancing in close column used by the 
Austrian infantry near suicidal. Later commentators have 
often drawn attention to the Prussian combat successes in 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 using this weapon as some-
thing that the Austrian generals failed to remark.
7
 Yet, 
despite the Austrian Army‟s reputation for tardiness when 
it came to innovation, we find that within two-and-a-half 
years of Königgrätz, the practical issues of outdated weap-
onry and tactics had been dealt with, in principle at least, 
though the regime within the war ministry was again found 
wanting in this respect in the mid-1870s. 
Franz Joseph‟s choice as the new reforming war minis-
ter was not an aristocrat. Appointed in 1868, General Franz 
Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld, like his fellow reformer General 
                                                        
6 See Scott Lackey, The Rebirth of the Habsburg Army, p. 31. 
7 See Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War, p. 34. 
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John, was the son of a low-ranking officer who had re-
ceived a noble title for exceptional bravery. He managed to 
reduce (at least temporarily) the independence of the gen-
eral staff and attempted to centralise planning operations 
within the War Ministry itself. 
8
 
The most radical reforms were enshrined in the Army 
Law of 5
th
 December 1868. For the first time in the long 
history of the Habsburg Empire, all of its male subjects 
were to be liable for military service. Conscription caused 
the single most far-reaching change in the lives of (male) 
Habsburg subjects for centuries, for it exacted from them a 
duty of service that had not previously obtained. It should 
not surprise us that the idea of a reciprocal right to vote 
was later adduced alongside the duty to serve in the armed 
forces at the time of Franz Joseph‟s decision to introduce 
universal male suffrage – at least in the Cisleithanian half 
of the Empire in 1907. 
The Army Law of 1868 created what is usually referred 
to in English as the Common Army – at first called the 
„kaiserlich-königliche Armee‟, changed in 1889 to „kaiser-
liche und königliche Armee‟ in deference to Hungarian 
sensitivities that the hyphen placed Hungary on a level 
with the other monarchies within the Empire.
9
   
A central Hungarian concern in negotiating the constitu-
tional compromise or Ausgleich of 1867 had been to estab-
lish an autonomous national army. The later Chief of 
General Staff and reformer General Friedrich von Beck 
was able to secure from the Hungarian representatives full 
support for conscription to the Common Army from the 
lands of the Hungarian Crown in return for the promise 
that 20% of all recruits would serve in a Transleithanian 
                                                        
8 See      n  e  , Beyond Nationalism, pp. 59-60. 
9 See Norman Stone, Europe Transformed, p. 306. 
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and therefore Hungarian-dominated Honvéd (home guard) 
or a Cisleithanian Landwehr.
10
 Though the Honvéd did not 
have artillery regiments and wore the same insignia as the 
troops of the Common Army, its men did swear a different 
oath, to Franz Joseph as the King of Hungary, rather than 
to Franz Joseph as Emperor of Austria. Of such small con-
cessions are national identities made. 
In theory, from 1868, all male subjects were to be liable 
for twelve years‟ service at the age of 20 (raised to 21 in 
1889), with exemptions for the clergy, teachers, theologi-
cal students and compassionate cases.
11
 The nobility also 
retained its immunity from military service on the basis of 
a law of 1827, though this rule did not apply in some prov-
inces.
12
 
Liability for service itself was decided by a drawing of 
lots. Those drawing the highest lots were inducted into the 
Common Army for three years‟ active service, and then 
spent seven years in reserve, with the final two years at-
tached to the Honvéd or Landwehr. Those drawing the 
middle lots spent two years on active service in the the 
Honvéd or Landwehr, then being placed in reserve. Active 
service typically could mean in such cases initial training 
followed by a two-week company drill and muster once a 
year, and a battalion exercise in alternate years. The final 
group drawing the lowest-numbered lots received no actual 
training but were placed in the reserve cadres of the Land-
sturm, or militia, to be called up only in time of war.
13
 
                                                        
10 See Tibor Balla. „Hungarian Soldiers in the Army of Dualism‟, p. 
325. 
11 See Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, pp. 80-81. 
12 See Alexander Hajdecki, Officiers-Standes-Privilegien, p. 65. 
13 See Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p. 80. 
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Despite these provisions Austria-Hungary never fully 
exploited her manpower potential. Recruitment figures 
were fixed by law and not automatically indexed to the 
rising population. The principal reason for this failure lay 
in the constitutional settlement itself. As a common institu-
tion the funding for the Imperial and Royal Army had to be 
approved by the so-called „delegations‟ of the parliaments 
of Vienna and Budapest every ten years. There were inher-
ent dangers. As László Péter has succinctly put it: „Argu-
ments about the status of the Army are the main vehicle for 
Hungarian nationalism after 1867‟.
14
 The raising of army 
recruits, determining the size of contingents that could be 
demanded from the Lands of the Hungarian Crown, re-
quired the consent of the delegation of Hungarian Parlia-
ment. Debates about this subject became „growth points 
for the Constitution‟ expending an extraordinary amount of 
parliamentary time.
15
 
The irony of this was that – unlike the German-speaking 
Liberals of the Vienna Parliament for example – the Hun-
garian delegations were not in principle against higher 
military spending, especially as some of it would go to 
bolster the symbolically important Honvéd contingents. 
Conscription was bound to alter the composition of the 
Army, since it brought individuals from every quarter of 
the polyglot Empire into the armed forces for the first time. 
The statistical information collected at the time confirms 
that the Armed forces became broadly representative of the 
population as a whole, but there were some discrepancies 
over speakers of languages that did not figure in the offi-
                                                        
14 László Péter, „The Army Question in Hungarian Politics‟, p. 87.   
15 László Péter, „The Army Question in Hungarian Politics, p. 87. 
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cial list. Deák cites such small groups as Friulians, Arme-
nians, Turks, Greeks and Romanis as examples.
16
 
Another major change to Habsburg military custom was 
an indirect consequence of the Austro-Prussian War. Tra-
ditionally, the Habsburg emperors had stationed troops 
outside of their home regions – the idea being that soldiers 
would be less likely to side with insurgent or revolutionary 
groupings if they came from another part of the Empire. 
Still smarting from defeat and humiliation at Königgrätz, 
the Habsburg high command became keen observers of 
German operations. Realising that Prussia had been able to 
mobilise an army of six hundred thousand men on its bor-
ders in three weeks using the railway network and ad-
vanced planning, spurred Friedrich Beck, at that point 
Head of the Military Chancellery, to propose a territorial 
system of deployment, under which troops would be garri-
soned wherever possible in their home region.
17
 This sys-
tem finally came into being after Beck‟s promotion to 
chief of general staff in 1882. The Empire was divided into 
fifteen (and later sixteen) territorial corps command areas, 
each of which raised an army corps principally consisting 
of soldiers recruited within that district.
18
 The exception 
was the XV corps in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which always 
served outside its home territory. Also, for practical rea-
sons more sparsely populated border areas would often be 
garrisoned by troops from other regions. In Galicia in par-
ticular, in preparation for mobilisation in a war against 
Russia, cavalry regiments from across the monarchy were 
deployed in rotation. Each command area was further sub-
                                                        
16 See      n  e  , Beyond Nationalism, p. 178. 
17 See Scott Lackey, The Rebirth of the Habsburg Army, p. 42. 
18 See James Sidney Lucas, Fighting Troops of the Austro-Hungar-
ian Army, p. 45. 
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divided into military districts, numbering 106 in total (ris-
ing to 112 in 1914).
19
 Nevertheless, distribution between 
the various service branches was sometimes dictated by 
practical considerations. There really were more Hungari-
ans in the cavalry, because of the geographical location of 
the cavalry regiments near the border with the Russian 
Empire, and more German-speakers in the Alpine infantry 
regiments.
20
 
Managing this multilingual rank and file that spoke at 
least 13 different languages was addressed in two ways. 
Firstly, German was decreed by the Emperor to be the 
language of command. Different sources give between 60 
and 80 words – in practice, a limited vocabulary through 
which officers commanded those in their charge.
21
 Sec-
ondly, each regiment would have one (or sometimes more) 
regimental languages, which their officers, supposing they 
were not themselves speakers of those languages, would be 
expected to learn. For example, by 1901, there were 94 
units in the Common Army using only German, 133 using 
two languages, 28 with three or even four. In the Hungar-
ian half of the monarchy there were 27 regiments which 
had various national languages as regimental language 
other than Hungarian. There were two regiments speaking 
Slovak, three Romanian, six German and Hungarian, one 
German and Slovak, three German and Romanian, five 
Hungarian and Slovak, six Hungarian and Romanian and 
even one Hungarian, Romanian and Ruthene (Ukraini-
nan).
22
 
                                                        
19 See Lackey, The Rebirth of the Habsburg Army, p. 112. 
20 See      n  e  , Beyond Nationalism, p. 180. 
21 See Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p 108. 
22 See Ian Foster The Image of the Habsburg Army, p. 10. 
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Educating and training an officer corps up to the chal-
lenge of commanding this new multilingual and socially 
diverse mass army therefore became a critical factor in 
ensuring its effectiveness in the field. It was the successes 
and failures in this programme that created the ferment 
from which the very literary officers of the Habsburg 
Army sprang in such numbers at the end of the nineteenth 
century.
23
 
Reform of military education had begun in fact before 
the military defeats of 1859 and 1866.
24
 Many of the so-
called „Militär-Erziehungs-Anstalten‟ had lost their educa-
tive function and degenerated into mere „Versorgungs-
häuser‟ for the sons of impecunious soldiers. The key 
institutions created by the first reforms of 1852 were the 
„Cadetten-Institute‟, which educated boys from the age of 
11 for four years. Their curriculum was a broad one. Relig-
ion, German, French, „Redekunst‟, natural history, geogra-
phy, history, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, 
„Abrichtungsreglement‟, drill („Exerzieren‟), penmanship 
(„Schönschreiben‟), free-hand drawing, gymnastics, fenc-
ing and swimming. Those who passed out successfully 
could proceed to the military academies at the age of 15 or 
16 to train directly as officers. There was originally a plan 
to create a single military academy at Wiener Neustadt, but 
the academies remained decentralised with a limited ca-
pacity restricted to 400 cadets in Wiener Neustadt, 200 in 
Olmütz (which moved to Mährisch-Weißkirchen in 1858), 
and 160 at Klosterbrück. 
These early changes were followed by substantial edu-
cational reforms in the Army Law of 1868. Two among 
                                                        
23 See      n  e  , Beyond Nationalism, pp. 213-224. 
24 See Helmut Engelbrecht, Geschichte des Oesterreichischen Bil-
dungswesens, Vol. 4, pp. 320-328. 
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these changed the character of the officer corps for ever. 
The first was the abolition of the rights of the Regiments-
inhaber, by means of which the aristocratic ceremonial 
commanders of each regiment had held the exclusive privi-
lege of nominating officers for promotion. Without Protek-
tion or patronage, chances of promotion were limited, 
especially for those who had risen through the ranks.
25
 
After 1868, decisions on promotion were passed in full to 
the Emperor and thus to the War Ministry. Secondly, the 
new category of Einjährig-Freiwillige, one-year volunteers 
was created in Austria-Hungary in 1868. These volunteer 
officers had helped to create a strong reserve officer corps 
in Prussia. Educated young men of good family were per-
mitted to volunteer for a single year‟s service. After this, 
they completed an examination to obtain a reserve offi-
cer‟s commission. In Austria-Hungary, pass rates were 
poor between 1869 and 1885, when only 35% of one-year 
volunteers were actually commissioned.
26
 Overall, the 
system was ultimately not as successful in Austria-
Hungary as it had been in Germany. One-year volunteer 
officers also attracted some resentment from career sol-
diers. A commentator writing in 1870 refers for example to 
the over-estimation of their own importance of these vol-
unteers and calls for some distinction in uniform to be 
made between them and the regular officer corps.
27
 
The Dual Monarchy never entirely made up the shortfall 
in the number of officers required by army estimates. By 
the turn of the century, Danzer’s Armee-Zeitung, a publi-
                                                        
25 See Ferdinand  on Saar‟  Novelle of 1887 Leutnant Burda for a 
psychological portrait of the social travails of the regimental offi-
cer without a powerful patron in the pre-reform era.   
26 See Gunther Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p. 82. 
27 See Österreichische Wehr-Zeitung, 6 November 1870. 
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cation close to the conservative circles of Franz Ferdinand, 
was to comment: „Der Mangel an Offiziersnachwuchs ist 
eine Tatsache, die immer wieder offiziös geleugnet wird 
und dennoch weiterbesteht‟.
28
 [„The lack of young officers 
in training is a fact that remains despite persistent official 
denials that there is a shortage.] Together with the absence 
of a strong body of senior non-commissioned officers, the 
poor standard of one-year volunteers gave rise to doubts 
about the Austro-Hungarian army‟s likely effectiveness in 
the field. The military experiences of non-military men, 
the former students, medical doctors and lawyers – Freud, 
Schnitzler, and Hofmannsthal among them – stem from the 
innovation of the One-Year Volunteer. 
The net result of these changes was an almost inevita-
ble, irreversible decline in the previously aristocratic char-
acter of the officer corps and the parallel emergence of a 
new professional caste which enjoyed a very different kind 
of education and also through its contact with the largely 
bourgeois Einjährig-Freiwillige a different set of social 
expectations. One contemporary commentator writing in 
1890 summed up the long-term consequences of the 
changes made in 1868: 
Seit dem Ausbruch der „neuen Aera“ i   der ö  erreichisch-
ungarische Adel der Armee auffallend und bedauerlich frem-
der geworden. Wenn es sich ehedem die ersten Familien des 
Reiches zur Ehre schätzten, ihre Söhne wenigstens bis zum 
Rittmeister in der Armee dienen zu sehen, begnügt man sich 
jetzt zumeist, das Einjährig-Freiwilligenjahr zu machen und 
dann die Reserveofficiers-Charge zu erwerben.29  
                                                        
28 Danzer’s Armee-Zeitung, 19 May 1904. 
29 Armee- und Marinezeitung. Militärische und belletristische Zeit-
schrift, 17 April 1890 Leader article on „Adel und Bürgerliche im 
Heer‟. 
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[Since the beginning of the „new era‟ the Austro-Hungarian 
nobility has been noticeably and regrettably less a part of the 
army. Whereas the first families of the Empire once held it an 
honour to have their sons serve at least long enough to become 
captains in the army, now one is increasingly content to mere-
ly have them complete the one-year volunteer service and gain 
a reserve officer‟s commission.] 
The emergence of a new professional military culture 
was reflected in and shaped by a number of related phe-
nomena. For a brief moment, Liberal politics was in the 
ascendant. The neo-absolutist state under Franz Joseph had 
been weakened by military defeats whose political conse-
quences were expressed in the Ausgleich of 1867. Before 
long, however, Liberalism itself was under threat as the 
stock exchange crash of 9 May 1873 damaged its credibil-
ity. Although censorship was well-established in the 1860s 
and 1870s, the debates on the army reform after 1868 were 
conducted in a public manner that was uncharacteristic of 
Austria-Hungary‟s military men and their institutions. As a 
retrospective overview put it in 1870: 
Das Streben nach geistiger Fortbildung hat einen neuen Auf-
schwung genommen. In den meisten größeren Garnisonen bil-
deten sich militär-wissenschaftliche Vereine […]. Die rege 
Theilnahme an der Militärpublizistik und die große Nachfrage 
nach den neuesten Erscheinungen der Fachliteratur […] geben 
Zeugniß für einen erhöhten geistigen Pulsschlag in der Ar-
mee.
30
 
[There has been an upturn in the striving for intellectual de-
velopment. In most larger garrisons military scientific clubs 
are forming […]. Active participation in military journalism 
and the high demand for the latest technical publications […] 
are evidence that the intellectual pulse of the army is beating 
faster.] 
                                                        
30 Österreichische Wehr-Zeitung 4 January 1870. 
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One key and previously under-examined source on these 
debates may be found in the military press of the period. 
There is a wealth of material, particularly in the weekly 
press, which reflects a vigorous and at times impassioned 
debate on military reforms being conducted in public.  
This military press can be classified in a number of 
ways. On the one hand, there were professional military 
journals. The most illustrious of these, the Österreichische 
Militärische Zeitschrift, had fallen into a moribund state 
and in fact been discontinued in the neo-absolutist era. It 
was refounded on the explicit instruction of Emperor Franz 
Joseph in 1860 under the editorship of Major Valentin 
Streffleur, one of the Emperor‟s former teachers and a 
noted statistician and cartographer.
31
 So successful and in-
fluential was Streffleur that the journal was named after 
him following his sudden death in 1870, giving us Stref-
fleurs Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, which ran 
until the demise of the Empire. 
The gathering impetus to professionalize training and 
raise the level of technical debates on military matters can 
also be gauged from the founding of the Organ der mili-
tärwissenschaftlichen Vereine in 1870 – a journal that 
subsequently evolved in 1882 into the Armeeblatt, a heav-
ily subsidized quasi-official publication. 
Analysing these largely technically-oriented publica-
tions allows us to quantify the rising educational levels and 
sophistication of the military establishment. However, 
there is a further category of the military press in Austria-
Hungary that flourished in the initial reform period which 
can assist in considering the more openly ideological as-
pects of officers‟ training: the military newspapers that 
                                                        
31 See „Valen in Ri  er  on S reffleur. Ne rolog‟ in Österreichische 
Militärische Zeitschrift, XI (1870) vol. 4, pp. 106-112. 
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grew up in this period. The most notable titles were the 
Neue Militär-Zeitung (1869-1895)
32
, the Oesterreichisch-
Ungarische Wehrzeitung: Der Kamerad (1869-1896) and 
Die Vedette (1869-1904). These newspapers typically 
appeared at least twice or three times a week, the Neue 
Militär-Zeitung on Wednesdays and Saturdays, the Wehr-
Zeitung on Wednesdays, Fridays and Sundays, the Vedette 
on Wednesdays and Sundays. They covered only items of 
interest to the army, rather than giving a military slant on 
current affairs in general. A leader on a technical matter or 
a current military story was followed by two or three pages 
of articles of a similar nature. Military publications were 
reviewed and internal army news reported. They even ran 
a soldiers‟ agony column where correspondents could ask 
for expert opinions on their problems. All of the three 
papers mentioned also published fiction in their Feuilleton 
section, as did subsequent similar publications. 
Fig. 1 Masthead Graphic of Armee-Zeitung. Organ 
für militärische Interessen (Detail). 
                                                        
32 The Neue Militär-Zeitung changed its title from the former Öster-
reichischer Soldatenfreund in 1869 and became the Militär-
Zeitung in 1873 after briefly going out of business. 
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Readerships were small and consisted almost exclu-
sively of serving and former officers. Often only a few 
thousand copies in total were printed, though actual reader 
numbers may have been far higher, given the culture of the 
Officiers-Kasino or officer ‟ me   and the coffee houses in 
urban centres.
33
 The financial viability of this genre of 
twice weekly military paper was also a constant problem. 
A number of the newspapers in question went through 
changes of ownership and title as they tried to maintain a 
stable presence. Some titles came and vanished rapidly. A 
typical example of this was the Armee-Zeitung. Organ für 
militärische Interessen, whose masthead alone indicates 
the level of its pretensions (see Fig. 1). It lasted a mere 18 
issues in 1872. We know from later cases that the War 
Ministry covertly subsidized some publications and also 
that the number of publications in this category grew far 
more slowly than other kinds of newspapers and maga-
zines in the first age of mass literacy that developed the 
capacity to produce large print runs rapidly.
34
 Advertising 
was one key source of additional revenue – something 
which can offer us insights into lifestyle and expectations 
of Habsburg officers. Typically, military newspapers con-
tain ads for uniform outfitters, gunsmiths or raincoat 
manufacturers, price lists for horses, notices for removal 
firms offering delivery to all parts of the empire or agen-
cies acting as middlemen for officers seeking to trade post-
ings, companies offering loans and financial services in 
respect of the Heiratskaution – the exorbitant deposit that 
                                                        
33 By comparison, growth in for example magazines and newspapers 
for women readers went from no recorded examples in 1875 to 86 
by 1913. See Ian Foster, The Image of the Habsburg Army, pp. 63-
64. 
34 See Ian Foster, The Image of the Habsburg Army, pp. 240-241. 
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serving officers had to raise if they wished to marry.
35
 
Hobbies and pastimes also featured in offers of musical 
instruments and supplies and notices commending fret-
work „zum Zeitverteib‟. Less savoury aspects of the all-
male environment are also evident in the discreet ads for 
contraceptives and „pikante Lectüre‟.  
The issue which attracted the most sustained coverage 
in the press of the early 1870s was without doubt military 
education and training. The War Minister appointed in 
1867 to reform the army, Freiherr Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld, 
had already made it clear that one of his principal concerns 
was military education and training by publishing an 
anonymous tract entitled Über die Reorganisierung der 
Militär-Bildungs-Anstalten in 1869.
36
 Kuhn was concerned 
to ensure that military men were not isolated from devel-
opments in civilian education and that in future promotions 
would be on merit and talent. Unfortunately, he had a 
powerful enemy in the shape of the „Generalinspektor des 
Heeres‟, the conservative Archduke Albrecht. Albrecht 
replied to Kuhn‟s intervention with a pamphlet of his own 
entitled Über den Armeegeist in 1870, which called upon 
Habsburg officers to maintain tradition and pride in the 
achievements of regiments and units and above all to con-
sider military education in moral terms. Where Kuhn had 
understood the need to forge an effective and fully profes-
sional cadre of officers from the relatively socially isolated 
caste of young men who would now seek service careers, 
Albrecht harked back to the social expectations that could 
no longer obtain. 
                                                        
35 See Gerwin Müller, „Heira   or chrif en und Heira   erhal en‟, 
pp. 97-99. 
36 See Peter Broucek, „Traditionsverständnis und Zukunftsvisionen 
in literarischen Arbeiten ö  erreichi cher Offiziere‟, pp. 512-513. 
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In a debate that stretched over five months and was only 
really sidelined by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian 
War, two of the military newspapers mentioned above took 
up adversarial positions that reflected the tension between 
Kuhn and Albrecht: the Österreichisch-ungarische Wehr-
Zeitung in support of Kuhn‟s reforms, the Neue Militär-
Zeitung in opposition to the new system.  
The opposing political stance of each paper can be seen 
in the exchange which began with an article in the Öster-
reichisch-ungarische Wehr-Zeitung on 30 January 1870, 
entitled „Gedanken über militärische Erziehung und Bil-
dung in Österreich von einem hohen Militär‟. Though it is 
not possible to identify the author, some of the content is 
suggestively similar to the wording of draft reform propos-
als in the Nachlass of Freiherr von Kuhn, architect of the 
reform.
37
 The article appeared in six parts, beginning on 
the inside pages and finishing as leader article in the issues 
of 9 and 11 February.  
The author reasons his case for reform by attributing 
blame for the defeats of 1859 and 1866 on „Mangel an 
Intelligenz‟, but clearly separates the role of the army from 
the neo-absolutist state when he insists it is an error to see 
the military solely as „Vertreterin des Absolutismus‟. He 
also advocates that attention must now be paid to the „Ver-
breitung des scientistischen Wissens‟. In the final two 
sections, he makes a number of telling observations about 
the social status of the officer. These form a clear contrast 
to the attitudes evident by the 1890s and 1900s, where the 
rhetoric of the officer class focussed on their separateness 
from the rest of society as honorary members of the first 
estate. A fine illustration of this can be seen in the republi-
                                                        
37 See Austrian State Archives: Kriegsarchiv, Militärische Nach-
lässe, VII, Catalogue number AT-OeStA/KA NL VII. 
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cation in 1911 of the work of the conservative Austrian 
General Karl Bigot de St Quentin (1805-1884), whose Von 
einem deutschen Soldaten, first published in 1847, put the 
ma  er a  follow : „…der Solda  […] ha  nich  , wenn ihn 
sein stolzes Selbstgefühl nicht über alle andern Stände 
heb …‟.
38
 By contrast, 40 years earlier, the Österreichisch-
ungarische Wehr-Zeitung (11 February 1870) considered 
that „die den Zöglingen beigebrachten Begriffe der Ehre 
und des Rechtes nicht das alleinige Prärogativ unseres 
Standes, sondern das jedes anständigen gebildeten, fein-
fühlenden Menschen jedweden Standes seien‟. [„the con-
cepts of honour and justice taught to the cadets are not the 
exclusive prerogative of our estate but belong to any de-
cent, educated, sensitive person of any class‟]. The author 
recommends that young officers should associate with 
educated people to acquire the manners of polite society 
and an appropriate social tone (9 February 1870). We also 
find a strong recommendation that rhetoric be cultivated 
extensively (11 February 1870). 
The rival Neue Militär-Zeitung, which published 43 ar-
ticles on the subject of military education and training, 
beginning on 19 February 1870, refers to the „Überstür-
zungen‟ („precipitate actions‟) and „zerstörungssüchtige 
Eile‟ („destructive haste‟) that now threaten „manches 
Gesunde und Erprobte‟ („many a healthy and tried and 
tested aspect‟) of the existing system. The principal se-
quence appears under the title „Das neue Erziehungssystem 
in den Militär-Bildungs-Anstalten‟ written by „ein Fach-
mann‟, an expert. 
The Fachmann sees the reforms as a botched and ill-
informed Experiment, a word that is emphasised in Sperr-
                                                        
38 Karl Graf Bigot de St. Quentin, Von einem deutschen Soldaten, p. 
54.  See also Istv n  e  , Beyond Nationalism, pp. 214-215. 
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druck, that crams too much into its curriculum that will 
result in „dünkelhafte Vielwisserei, eine unbrauchbare 
Halbheit in den jungen Männern‟, „vain know-all posturing 
and a useless insipidity in the young men‟ (5 March 1870). 
He is concerned that young military academicians are now 
allowed to leave their place of education and take part in 
the life of their towns and cities. 
The vehemence of the articles prompted an official re-
sponse: the Neue Militär-Zeitung was forced to publish a 
six-page supplement refuting the accusations of the Fach-
mann (30 March 1870). Influence and conviction was 
clearly on the side of the Österreichisch-ungarische Wehr-
Zeitung in this debate, as the supplement was announced 
as having been sent in from a high office of government 
(„eingesendet von hoher Stelle‟). The author attributed the 
criticism of the new system published in the Neue Militär-
Zeitung to those who had lost out under the new system – 
supernumerary commanders and teachers from disbanded 
schools and parents unhappy that they would no longer 
receive a free education for their sons. 
The extended public debate on the kind of education of-
ficers should receive demonstrates that the decidedly more 
bourgeois take on these matters represented by Kuhn at the 
War Ministry was vehemently rejected by Archduke Al-
brecht and his supporters. Kuhn was replaced in 1874 by 
the more conservative General Friedrich Beck-Rzikowsky 
(1830-1920). Beck, who became a personal friend of the 
Emperor, did not reverse all of his predecessor‟s reforms. 
In particular, the key elements of the ideology of the post-
1868 officer corps remained in place until the First World 
War – its conception of itself as the apolitical servant of 
the dynasty, its peculiar mix of bourgeois liberal notions of 
self-improvement and aristocratic exclusiveness. 
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